How al Qaeda cells form before attacks.
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An analysis of using human source for counterterrorism from the Belgian police
This interview with a Belgian federal police officer is really great. He gives a huge amount of insight into the counter terrorism process inside Belgium, and Europe.
The interview with the alleged mastermind of the Paris attacks. The interview was in ISIS’ “lifestyle” magazine Dabiq #7, available here
This document, “The Myth of Delusion”, contains a detailed assessment of the capabilities of the US IC and how these capabilities are used against AQ operatives. Quite an interesting read.
This is pretty damning of the FBI. They are drowning in data and incapable of handling what they already have. Calls for banning encryption are seriously misguided when the FBI can’t even handle Twitter.
Jihadists’ main tool for planning and executing attacks in recent years has been social media — to which the government has full access — not encrypted messaging.
The FBI had a full week to investigate and prevent the Garland shooting. Instead they complain about lack of retroactive visibility.
Attacker Elton Simpson, who was under previous FBI terror-related investigations, used Twitter to openly follow and communicate with high-profile terrorists. His account was followed by prominent English-speaking Islamic State fighters and recruiters Abu Rahin Aziz and Junaid Hussain — both of whom for a long time were known to provide manuals on how to carry out lone-wolf attacks from Raqqa, Syria, before they were killed. Simpson also followed and communicated with Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan, a known American jihadist in Somalia who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.Relatedly, the incitement for the Texas shooting came from Hassan’s 31st Twitter account. Simpson, a friend and follower of Hassan, retweeted the call and later requested that Hassan send him a direct message. We at SITE, using only open-source information, reported on the call before the attack took place, and the FBI had a week to investigate the matter before the shooting. Though only nine Twitter users retweeted the call for attack, the FBI failed to prevent it.
It’s funny because it’s true
From Duffel Blog 2014-09-14
“[W]e will begin conducting airstrikes inside Syria at a time and place of our choosing. Under the direction of Gen. Lloyd Austin at Central Command, the military will target key militant facilities, armament, and weaponry, until they smarten up and completely blend in with the local populace.”
And now in Vice 2015-03-09
“It can be quite difficult to determine, sometimes, whether that truck driving through the desert just happens to be a local merchant driving from one supply point to a local town that he services, or whether that’s something of interest—ISIL has adjusted their tactics to mimic those local movements, which makes it a challenge.”
It’s almost like we’ve learned these lessons before….
Rapid Deployment of Terrorist Assets
A problem that security forces have is the rapid pace with which a Paris style attack can be planned, prepared and executed. An attack involving a bomb requires more preparation as the ingredients are gathered, the explosives manufactured and the bomb assembled. During this time the terrorist(s) are engaged in risky activities and have incriminating evidence on them. Equipment for an attack involving only firearms however, can be acquired at the last minute. As long as the gunman is proficient in arms already, he only needs to gain access to the equipment the day of the attack.
This rapid deployment attack style means that the terrorists can operate with little or no evidence of their developing plan. This can make proving that there is a plan in development extremely difficult for security forces. They might only have a few days from conception to actual attack.
Fascinating interview.
What were their names? Abu Khaled claimed not to know. “We don’t ask these kinds of questions. We are all ‘Abu Something.’ Once you start asking about personal histories, this is the ultimate red flag.”
This is very typical of illicit organizations. Attempts to collect intelligence, such as personal histories, are serious counterintelligence red flags. There’s no reason someone needs to know this info except as a spy.
Part Two: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/16/how-isis-picks-its-suicide-bombers.html
Part Three: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/17/inside-isis-torture-brigades.html
Part Four: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/18/how-i-escaped-from-isis.html
This is the thesis that grew up to become “Terrorism and Counterintelligence”.